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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Lee A. Ridgley appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that he raised a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether his attorney in the underlying criminal case was ineffective. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
In 2002, Mr. Ridgley pled guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under the age of 
sixteen. (R., pp.3-4.) He then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied; the 
ldaho Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. (R., p.35; 
100.) Mr. Ridgley then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.3.) 
In his petition, Mr. Ridgley asserted that his attorney was ineffective. (R., p.4.) 
He stated that on February 10, 2002, his wife died due to complications with asthma 
and that he was arrested on the lewd conduct charge shortly after her death. (R., p.4.) 
He was emotionally distraught due to his wife's death and was severely depressed. 
(R., p.4.) Even worse, there was speculation that he would be charged with murder for 
his wife's death. (R., p.4.) Mr. Ridgley was "in complete emotion shut down and a state 
of confusion." (R., p.4.) Due to his wife's death, Mr. Ridgley's children were "sheltered 
by the ldaho Department of Health and Welfare" and he was going through both 
criminal proceedings and civil child protection proceedings. (R., p.4.) 
Mr. Ridgley asserted that his court-appointed attorney spent less than one hour 
with him before he entered his guilty plea. (R., p.4.) He was never provided with the 
police report, and his counsel, other than reading the police report, did not contact any 
witnesses, did not watch any video or audiotapes, and did not listen to Mr. Ridgley when 
Mr. Ridgley said that he was not understanding the other attorney's comments. 
(R., p.4.) Mr. Ridgley told his attorney that he was suffering from depression and did 
not understand what was transpiring in his cases but his attorney did not discuss any 
potential defenses he had to the case. (R., p.4.) 
Mr. Ridgley acknowledged that he signed a written plea of guilty, but he asserted 
that he "was in such a state of shock and disbelief of the rush of what was going on, the 
complete devastation of losing my wife and my family and within a three (3) week period 
of time entering my guilty plea to the charge, I had expressed complete break down to 
my attorney and I expressed that I was not mentally well." (R., p.4.) He also asserted 
that his attorney did not advise him of the potential of having a mental health evaluation 
or discuss whether or not he would be able to "appreciate the proceedings that were 
filed against me or be able to assist in my defense." (R., p.4.) 
Mr. Ridgley subsequently received a different lawyer, who filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. (R., p.5.) Mr. Ridgley asserted that during the hearing on the 
motion, his counsel admitted that he had not spent more than an hour with him, did not 
know the names of anyone mentioned in the police report, that he never shared the 
police report with him, had never watched any videotapes of interviews with the alleged 
victim, did not listen to the audiotapes, did not conduct any independent investigation, 
and never discussed the facts of the charge or explain any defenses that Mr. Ridgley 
might have had. (R., p.5.) Counsel allegedly stated that Mr. Ridgley was under a lot of 
stress and just wanted the charge to go away, which was the basis of entering into plea 
negotiations. (R., p.5.) 
The State responded and moved for summary dismissal. (R., p.14.) However, 
the district court also issued a notice of intent to dismiss. (R., p.105.) The court noted 
that the transcript of the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea "factually 
supports some of Petitioner's allegations," there was "nevertheless insufficient evidence 
that the whole of counsel's representation of Petition was objectively unreasonable, 
especially in light of Petitioner's indication at the time that he simply the wanted the 
criminal matter over with. . . ." (R., p.108.) Further, the court held that, even if Mr. 
Ridgley had established deficient representation, "there is a total lack of evidence that, 
but for counsel's deficiencies, Petitioner would have insisted on going to trial. Even with 
all the information Petitioner now has, he does not unequivocally state that he would 
proceed to trial." (R., p.109.) 
Mr. Ridgley submitted a response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss 
and supplemented it with affidavits from himself and his post-conviction counsel and 
with a report from Jonelle Timiin. (R., p.133.) Mr. Ridgley's affidavit stated that he told 
his attorney that he was under severe depression and that he did not understand the 
proceedings against him. (R., pp.112-123.) Further the affidavit averred that he told his 
attorney that he had been seen by Tam Judy, a counselor at the Boundary County 
Sheriff's Office, due to his depression and suicidal thoughts but that his attorney never 
spoke to him about receiving a mental health evaluation or about understanding the 
proceedings against him. (R.  p . 3 )  The affidavit also asserted that Mr. Ridgley was 
asserting that he wanted to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. (R., p.114.) 
Mr. Ridgley's post-conviction attorney, in his affidavit, asserted that he spoke with 
the prosecutor's office, who informed him that tapes were available for review along with 
the rest of the discovery that was picked up by Mr. Ridgley's initial attorney. The post- 
conviction attorney also stated that, "had a client told me he was severely depressed 
and suffered an emotional breakdown and had been seen by a psychologist due to 
suicidal idealations and had been incarcerated the day after his wife's death . . . I would 
have been seriously concerned about his mental status, and whether or not he could 
understand the proceedings against him. . . ." (R., p.118-119.) Even if a client had told 
him he wanted to plead just to get the case over with, he would have requested an 
evaluation under I.C. § 18-210 before entering into plea negotiations. (R., p.119.) In 
addition, he would have reviewed the police reports and tapes to be fully informed 
before advising a client to plead guilty. (R., p.119.) 
The district court was not persuaded. (R., p.152.) The court held that the 
responses to the notice of intent to dismiss did not rectify the problems with the initial 
petition. (R., p.154.) The district court then discussed the effect of the Court of 
Appeals' ruling that Mr. Ridgley had not supplied a just reason to withdraw his guilty 
plea. (R., p.154.) The district court found that "the grounds and arguments asserted by 
Ridgley during his appeal were virtual mirror images of the arguments he now states in 
this action." (R., p.154.) The district court also found that the: 
"only 'new' evidence submitted in support of the petition herein that was 
not before the criminal trial judge is the Ridgley affidavit and the Hull [post- 
conviction attorney] affidavit commenting on Ridgley's mental condition 
and the failure of attorney Williams to advise Ridgley of, or to 
independently request, a mental health evaluation." 
(R., p.155.) 
Further, while acknowledging that "the standard for an effective assistance of 
counsel claim is different than that for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea . . . this Court 
finds the factual similarities of Ridgley's claims extraordinary. . . ." (R., p.155.) 
Mr. Ridgley appealed. (R., p.165.) Mr. Ridgley asserts that the district court 
erred by summarily dismissing his petition because he raised a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether his counsel was ineffective and by dismissing on grounds 
not set forth in the notice of intent to dismiss. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Ridgley's petition for post- 
conviction relief because he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
his attorney was ineffective? 
2. Did the district court err by dismissing on grounds not set forth in the notice of 
intent to dismiss? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred Bv Summarilv Dismissing Mr. Ridalev's Petition For Post- 
Conviction Relief Because He Raised A Genuine lssue Of Material Fact As To Whether 
His Attorney Was lneffective 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ridgley asserts that, contrary to the district court's conclusions, that he raised 
a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat sua sponfe dismissal in this case. 
B. The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissina Mr. Ridqlev's Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief Because He Raised A Genuine lssue Of Material Fact As 
To Whether His Attorney Was lneffective 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is separate and 
distinct from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction. 
Peltier v. State, 119 ldaho 454, 456, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). It is a civil proceeding 
governed by the UPCPA and the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peltier, 11 9 ldaho at 
456, 808 P.2d at 375. Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner must prove his 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 ldaho 813, 816, 
892 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1995). 
However, the petition initiating a post-conviction proceeding differs from the 
complaint initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition is required to include more 
than "a short and plain statement of the claim"; it "must be verified with respect to facts 
within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence 
supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such 
supporting evidence is not attached." Id.; I.C. 3 19-4903. "In other words, the 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." Small v. State, 132 ldaho 
327, 331,971 P.2d 11 51, 11 55 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the 
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.C. § 19- 
4906(c).' In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the district court 
need not "accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by 
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law." Martinez, 126 ldaho at 816- 
17, 892 P.2d at 492-492. However, if the petitioner presents any evidentiary support for 
his allegations, the district court must take the petitioner's allegations as true, at least 
until such time as they are controverted by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 ldaho 643, 
646, 448 P.2d 649, 652 (1968). This is so even if the allegations appear incredible on 
their face. Id. Thus, only after the State controverts the petitioner's allegations can the 
district court consider the evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 ldaho 612, 651 P.2d 546 
(Ct. App. 1982). But in doing so, it must still liberally construe the facts and draw 
reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner, Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 
1155. 
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 11 55. 
1 Although this standard is set forth in section 19-4906(c), which deals with motions for summary 
disposition, it appears to apply to sua sponte dismissals under section 19-4906(b) as well. See, e.g., 
Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155 (discussing the standard for summary disposition under 
section 19-4906 generally as being whether a genuine issue of material fact has been presented). 
If there is no question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
dismissal can be ordered sua sponte. I.C. 3 19-4906(c). 
If the district court orders dismissal sua sponte, it must first give the petitioner 
twenty days' notice and allow the petitioner to respond to the notice. I.C. § 19-4906(b). 
The purpose of this requirement is to give the petitioner an opportunity to challenge the 
decision before it is finalized. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 ldaho 156, 159-160, 715 P.2d 
369, 371-372 (Ct. App. 1986). Thus, this requirement is strict; it makes no difference 
whether the petitioner's claims are meritorious or not. Cherniwchan v. State, 99 ldaho 
128, 129-30, 578 P.2d 244, 245-246 (1978). Moreover, vague notice of the district 
court's intent to dismiss is insufficient. The district court must be specific as to the basis 
for the intended dismissal so as to provide the petitioner with a meaningful opportunity 
to respond. Banks v. State, 123 ldaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993). If the district 
court fails to give the petitioner the required notice and opportunity to respond, or if the 
district court's notice is impermissibly vague, the petition must be reinstated. Peltier, 
119 ldaho at 456-457, 458, 808 P.2d at 375-376, 377 (failure to give any notice); Banks, 
123 ldaho at 954, 855 P.2d at 39 (notice was impermissibly vague). 
In its notice of intent to dismiss, the district court identified only two reasons for 
its intent to dismiss: 1) that "the Court cannot find on this record that counsel's 
representation of Petitioner was objectively unreasonable;" and 2) "even assuming 
deficient representation, there is a total lack of evidence that, but for counsel's alleged 
deficiencies, Petitioner would have insisted on going to trial." (R., p.109.) 
The standard for evaluation of ineffective assistance claims was recently 
summarized in State v. McKeeth, 140 ldaho 847, 850, 103 P.3d 460, 463 (2004): 
The test for determining whether a defendant has received effective 
assistance of counsel is the two-part test established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); 
State v. Mathews, 133 ldaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999). The 
first prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to show that 
counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The 
second prong requires the defendant to "show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense." Id. In determining whether a 
defendant was deprived of reasonably competent assistance of counsel 
as guaranteed by the ldaho Constitution, article 1, section 13, ldaho courts 
employ the same two-part test. Mathews, 133 ldaho at 306, 986 P.2d at 
329; Aragon v. State, 114 ldaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 
(I 988). 
Id. 
This test has been specifically applied in cases such as this one: where the 
petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective for giving bad legal advice and thereby 
inducing the petitioner to plead guilty. See generally McKeeth. 
As to the first prong of the Strickland test, the ldaho courts have held that the 
attorney's performance is deficient if it "falls 'outside the wide range of professional 
norms."' McKeeth, 140 ldaho at 850, 103 P.3d at 463 (quoting Mathews, 133 ldaho at 
306, 986 P.2d at 329). As to the second prong of the Strickland test, a petitioner is 
prejudiced if his "counsel's deficient performance 'affected the outcome of the plea 
process."' McKeeth, 140 ldaho at 851, 103 P.3d at 464 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). He need not show that he would have prevailed at trial. McKeeth, 
140 ldaho at 852, 103 P.3d at 465. 
In this case, in the notice of intent to dismiss, the district court held, "the Court 
cannot find on this record that counsel's representation of Petitioner was objectively 
unreasonable." (R., p.109.) This is an incorrect standard. At the summary dismissal 
stage, Mr. Ridgley is not required to prove that he is entitled to post-conviction relief; 
rather, he need only raise a genuine issue of material fact. I.G. § 19-4906. In this case, 
he raised such an issue. 
Mr. Ridgley's complaints against his trial attorney are summarized above, and 
even the district court admitted that many of his allegations were supported by evidence 
in the record, stating: 
the transcript of the hearing on Petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea 
factually supports some of Petitioner's allegations, e.g., that counsel spent 
approximately one hour personally with Petitioner prior to entry of the 
guilty plea, that counsel did not provide Petitioner with a copy of the police 
report, and that counsel did not review the audio and video tapes of the 
interview of the alleged victim. 
(R., p.108.) Based on this statement alone, Mr. Ridgley should have survived summary 
dismissal - he made specific allegations of how his counsel was deficient and these 
allegations were supported by the record. However, the district court found this 
evidence to be "insufficient that the whole of counsel's representation of Petitioner was 
objectively reasonable, especially in light of Petitioner's indication that he simply wanted 
the criminal matter over with. . . ." and then focused on the attorney's testimony in the 
underlying criminal case wherein he testified that Mr. Ridgley was aware of the benefits 
of the plea bargain and that he was adequately advised. (R., p.108.) However, the 
district court was improperly weighing the evidence - balancing Mr. Ridgley's evidence 
against the testimony of his attorney, and concluding that is could not find the attorney's 
representation unreasonable 
Further, the other alleged inadequacies addressed by the district court were 
remedied by Mr. Ridgley's response to the notice of intent to dismiss. The court noted 
that there was no evidence that any tapes were actually available for review. 
(R., p.109.) In his affidavit, Mr. Ridgley's post-conviction attorney asserted that he 
spoke with the prosecutor's office, who informed him that tapes were in fact available for 
review. ( R  p . 8 )  The district court also noted that there was no evidence that 
Mr. Ridgley told his attorney that he was severely depressed and did not understand the 
proceedings; Mr. Ridgley's affidavit specifically asserted that he told his counsel these 
things. (R., pp.109; 112-1 13.) 
Mr. Ridgley specifically alleged how counsel was ineffective, and, even according 
to the district court, these allegations were supported by the record. While the district 
court may have believed that counsel's representation as a whole was sufficient, the 
district court was applying the wrong standard - the only requirement necessary to 
defeat summary dismissal is that the petitioner raise a genuine issue of material fact, 
and by supplying specific, supported, allegations of deficient performance, Mr. Ridgley 
presented evidence to overcome a sua sponte dismissal. The district court improperly 
dismissed Mr. Ridgley's petition on this basis. 
Also, the district court concluded that, "even assuming deficient representation, 
there is a total lack of evidence that, but for counsel's deficiencies, Petitioner would 
have insisted on going to trial." (R., p.109.) This assertion is specifically rebutted in 
Mr. Ridgley's affidavit in response to the notice of intent to dismiss. In the affidavit, 
Mr. Ridgley repeatedly says that it was his intent to go to trial, stating, "[ilf I am 
successful in my Post Conviction Relief, I will go to trial as I am not guilty of the 
allegations charged against me by the State." ( R  p . 3 )  Later in the affidavit, he 
avers, "I am not guilty of the charged offenses and intend to fully go to trial should this 
court grant my post conviction for relief" and that, "[ilt is not my intent to negotiate any of 
the charges which would result in me pleading guilty." ( R  p . 4 )  Mr. Ridgley 
specifically asserted that he was not guilty of the charge and would insist on taking the 
case to trial. 
In the ordering dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief, the district court 
also relied heavily on the fact that Mr. Ridgley had filed a motion to withdraw his plea in 
the underlying criminal case and that the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of this 
motion.' (R., p.154.) The court noted that the "grounds and arguments asserted by 
Ridgley during the appeal were virtual mirror images of the arguments he now states in 
this action." (R., p.154.) The court acknowledged that the "standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel . . . is different than that for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, but 
nonetheless this Court finds the factual similarities of Ridgley's claims extraordinary, 
particularly on those issues where the evidence before this Court is no different than the 
evidence before the criminal trial judge." (R., p.155.) The Court of Appeals' Opinion 
affirming the denial of Mr. Ridgley's motion is in the record in this case. (R., pp.100- 
104.) 
Based on the findings made by the trial court in the motion to withdraw the plea, 
which was affirmed on appeal, the district court held that, "this Court cannot find that the 
attorney . . . failed to offer an objectively reasonable level of representation." 
(R., p.156.) Further, the court noted that the allegations of depression and confusion 
were not presented to the court in the motion to withdraw the guilty plea in the 
underlying criminal case, where Mr. Ridgley was represented by the same attorney who 
represented him in the instant action. (R., p.155-157.) 
Mr. Ridgley also asserts that it was error for the district court to be considering the motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea at all, and this claim is addressed in Issue I I .  
13 
Post-conviction relief is available where "there exists evidence of material facts, 
not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence 
in the interest of justice." I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) (emphasis added). A post-conviction 
action is not a substitute for and does not supplant a direct appeal from the conviction or 
sentence. I.C. § 19-4901(b); Paradis v. State, 110 ldaho 534, 537, 716 P.2d 1306, 
1309. Therefore, "[a] convicted defendant may not simply relitigate the same factual 
questions in his application, in virtually the same factual context already presented in a 
direct appeal." Whitehawk v. State, 116 ldaho 831, 833, 780 P.2d 153, 155 (1989). 
While in this case Mr. Ridgley is relying on many of the same facts set forth in his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he is not simply relitigating previous-heard issues. 
As the district court itself noted, the "standard for ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is 
different than that for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. . . ." (R., p.155.) The district 
court was correct in this regard; a motion to withdraw a guilty plea invokes the discretion 
of the district court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Acevedo, 131 ldaho 513, 516, 960 P.2d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1998). 
A petition for post-conviction relief is not left to the district court's discretion; if a 
defendant raises a genuine issue of material fact, the district court is required to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing. On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application 
without an evidentiary hearing, this Court determines whether a genuine issue of fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits 
on file and liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non- 
moving party. LaBelle v. State, 130 ldaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The abuse of discretion standard does not apply. 
Therefore, in the instant case, as opposed to the motion to withdraw the plea, the 
facts and inferences are construed in favor of Mr. Ridgley. Therefore, it was 
inappropriate for the district court to hold that, since many of the facts surrounding 
Mr. Ridgley's representation were presented to the trial court and resolved against him, 
that the facts could be resolved against him in the instant case particularly where a 
vastly different standard of review applied in the previous case. Furthermore, the issue 
in the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was whether Mr. Ridgley was adequately 
informed of the nature of the charge against him; the issue in this case is whether 
Mr. Ridgley's attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately review 
the file and discuss Mr. Ridgley's options with him. 
The district court also largely discounted the claim that Mr. Ridgley was suffering 
from severe depression and did not understand the proceedings because Mr. Hull, who 
represented Mr. Ridgley in both the instant case and in the motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea, did not raise the issue in the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. (R., p.157.) The 
court noted that Mr. Hull did not request a mental health evaluation at the time of the 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea. (R., p.157.) 
Here again, the district court is resolving inferences against Mr. Ridgley when it 
should be resolving them in his favor. The district court's concerns illustrate that 
Mr. Ridgley perhaps had another claim of ineffective assistance for counsel's 
representation during the motion to withdraw a guilty plea, but they do not supply a 
reason to draw inferences against him. Mr. Ridgley provided new information to the 
district court, both in his and Mr. Hull's affidavits, and the Timlin report attached to 
Mr. Hull's supplemental affidavit. 
The District Court Erred Bv Sua Sponte Dismissina The Petition On Grounds Not Set 
Forth In The Notice Of lntent To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
Because the notice of intent to dismiss did not address any issues relating to 
Mr. Ridgley's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he asserts that it was improper for the 
district court to rely on that motion in sua sponte dismissing the petition. 
B. The District Court Erred Bv Sua Sponte Dismissina The Petition On Grounds Not 
Set Forth In The Notice Of Intent To Dismiss 
The district court may not summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief 
without first providing an applicant with adequate notice of its reasons for dismissal. 
Downing v. State, 132 ldaho 861, 863, 979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1999). The 
district court must identify with particularity why an applicant's evidence or legal theories 
are considered deficient. Id. at 864, 979 P.2d at 1222. The district court must give 
notice of any deficiency in the applicant's evidence or any legal analysis that he needs 
to address in order to avoid dismissal of his petition. Martinez v. State, 126 ldaho 813, 
818, 892 P.2d 488, 493 (Ct. App. 1995). The district court may only dismiss a petition 
based on the rational articulated in the notice provided. Id. at 817-818, 892 P.2d at 492- 
93. "The statutory duty to specify the reasons for the proposed dismissal under 
I.C. 3 19- 4906(b) rests solely with the district court and it is the district court alone who 
is responsible for drafting the notice of intent to dismiss." Crabtree v. State, 144 ldaho 
489, -, 163 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Downing v. State, 132 ldaho 861, 
864, 979 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 1999)). "The state's motion to dismiss cannot . . . 
be invoked by the state to cure any deficiencies in the district court's notice of intent 
issued pursuant to I.C. 9 19-4906(b)." Id. 
In the ordering dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief, the district court 
relied heavily on the fact that Mr. Ridgley had filed a motion to withdraw his plea in the 
underlying criminal case and that the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of this 
motion. (R., p.154.) The court noted that the "grounds and arguments asserted by 
Ridgley during the appeal were virtual mirror images of the arguments he now states in 
this action." (R., p.154.) The court acknowledged that the "standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel . . . is different than that for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, but 
nonetheless this Court finds the factual similarities of Ridgley's claims extraordinary, 
particularly on those issues where the evidence before this Court is no different than the 
evidence before the criminal trial judge." (R., p.155.) 
The district court's notice of intent to dismiss omits any mention of Mr. Ridgley's 
motion to withdraw his plea. As such, Mr. Ridgley was never put on notice that he had 
to persuade the district court that his current action was different or that the district 
court's or Court of Appeals' findings should not be used against him. Mr. Ridgley was 
put on notice only that the district court believed that he had failed to present sufficient 
evidence that counsel's performance was deficient or that he had been prejudiced. 
Therefore, it was improper for the district court to analogize the instant case to his 
motion in the criminal case. 
Mr. Ridgley acknowledges that the State's motion for summary dismissal did 
assert that his current claims were foreclosed by the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
(R., pp.19-21.) However, the district court never addressed the State's motion, it WAS 
proceeding solely upon the notice of intent to dismiss, and the "state's motion to dismiss 
cannot . . . be invoked by the state to cure any deficiencies in the district court's notice 
of intent issued pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b)." Crabtree v. State, 144 Idaho 489, -, 
163 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, the State may not rely on the motion 
for summary dismissal; the focus is solely on the notice of intent to dismiss, which does 
not address the motion to withdraw the guilty plea at all. The district court's order must 
therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ridgley respectfully requests that the district court's order dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and his case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
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